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Previous research has found that masked repetition primes, presented immediately prior
to the test item in a recognition memory test, increase the likelihood that participants
think that the item was present in a previous study phase, even if it was not. This memory
illusion is normally associated with a feeling of familiarity, rather than recollection (e.g., as
indexed by Remember/Know judgments), and has been explained in terms of an increased
fluency of processing the test item, which, in the absence of awareness of the cause of that
fluency (i.e., the masked prime), is attributed instead to prior exposure in the study phase.
Recently however, we have found that masked conceptual primes (semantically rather
than associatively related to the test item) have the opposite effect of increasing Remember
but not Know judgments. This result appears difficult to explain in terms of existing
theories of recollection and familiarity. Here we report data from a functional magnetic
resonance imaging study using the same design, in which we replicate our previous
behavioral findings, and find converging evidence for increased activity following
conceptual primes in brain regions associated with recollection. This neural evidence
supports an account in terms of “true” recollection (for example, conceptual primes
reactivating semantically related information that was generated at encoding), rather than
an artifact of the mutually-exclusive nature of the Remember/Know procedure.
ª 2012 Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction terms of recollection and familiarity (for review, see e.g.,Over the last three decades since Mandler’s (1980) proposal
that recognition memory can be supported by two distinct
processes, numerous behavioral dissociations, in healthy
individuals, patients with varieties of brain damage, andmore
recently in other animals, have been interpreted in terms of
the processes of “recollection” and “familiarity” (for review,
see e.g., Yonelinas, 2002; Aggleton and Brown, 2006). Over the
last two decades, dissociations in functional neuroimaging
data, using similar paradigms, have also been interpreted inBrain Sciences Unit, 15 C
m.ac.uk (J.R. Taylor).
er CC BY license.Diana et al., 2007; Mayes et al., 2007). However, the strength of
these interpretations rests on the validity of the mapping
between experimental measures (that give rise to the disso-
ciations) and the theoretical concepts of recollection and
familiarity; a mapping that has often been questioned (e.g.,
Wixted, 2007). Some researchers like Donaldson (1996) and
Dunn (2008), for example, have argued that evidence from
Remember/Know judgments, Confidence judgments (e.g.,
ROC curves) and even Source judgments can be re-interpreted
in terms of a single dimension of memory strength (i.e.,haucer Road, Cambridge CB2 7EF, United Kingdom.
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of familiarity and recollection; see recent exchange in Trends
in Cognitive Science, 2011, Issue 15). Moreover, the precise
nature of the empirical dissociation e for example, a single,
double, or cross-over dissociation e has also been questioned,
particularly in neuroimaging data where the mapping
between hemodynamic measures and theoretical concepts
like memory strength, for example, may be nonlinear
(Henson, 2006; Squire et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the popularity
of the recollection/familiarity distinction is due largely to the
convergence of empirical dissociations across a range of
paradigms, most of which appear relatively easy to explain in
terms of two distinct processes of recollection and familiarity.
In a standard recognition memory paradigm, a series of
items are presented in a Study phase (“studied” items), which
participants then have to distinguish, when presented again
in a later Test phase, from randomly intermixed “unstudied”
items that were not presented at Study. As elaborated in other
articles in this special issue, recollection in this paradigm
generally refers to retrieval (recall) of contextual information
that was present at Study, but that is not present at Test.
Examples of this contextual information include spatial
location of an item, or other thoughts/associations prompted
by that item (corresponding to “external” and “internal”
“source” information respectively; Johnson et al., 1993).
Conversely, familiarity generally refers to a unitary, acontex-
tual signal associated with the test cue itself, owing for
example to residual effects of its recent processing in the
Study phase (though may also have other causes; see below),
which is attributed to the Study phase by the participant.
One variant of the recognition memory paradigm that has
been used to support the recollection/familiarity distinction
was introduced by Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989). In theFig. 1 e Schematic of trial procedure at Test. Duration of each ev
on the timeline does not reflect duration).“masked” versionof this paradigm, each item in theTest phase
is preceded by a brief,masked stimulus, forwhich participants
typically have little to no awareness (or at least, do not appear
to spontaneously identify).When themasked stimulus (prime)
matches the test item (target), for example corresponding to
the sameword just in adifferent letter case (see ahead to Fig. 1),
participants are more likely to call the test item “old” (i.e.,
indicate that it was studied), relative to when the masked
stimulus is a different item (unprimed case). Importantly, this
increased tendency to call test items “old” typicallyoccursboth
for studied items (“hits”) and unstudied items (“false alarms”;
FAs). Jacoby and Whitehouse explained this memory illusion
in terms of a matching prime increasing the fluency with
which a test item is processed, and participants being likely to
erroneously attribute this increased fluency, when unaware of
its true cause, to the prior Study phase (and hence this could
occur for both studied and unstudied items). In support of this
hypothesis, when participants were made aware of the prime
in a second condition (by increasing the prime duration), this
memory illusionactually reversed, such that participantswere
now less likely to call test items “old” followingmatching than
non-matching primes (which the authors interpreted as
participants now sometimes erroneously attributing the
fluency induced by study to the prime instead; though see
Klinger, 2001; Higham and Vokey, 2004, for alternative expla-
nations for the precise role of awareness/attention).
Though Jacoby and Whitehouse’s original findings did not
specifically address the familiarity/recollection distinction,
a later variant by Rajaram (1993; see also Kinoshita, 1997;
Woollams et al., 2008) asked participants for a Remember (R)/
Know (K) judgment after each “old” decision to words
(Tulving, 1985). Rajaram found that the increase in “old”
judgments following masked, matching prime words wasent is given in square brackets (note that spacing of objects
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detectable effect on trials given R judgments). This finding is
relatively easy to explain according to the recollection-
familiarity distinction: The fluency with which test words
are processed can be used as an acontextual familiarity signal;
whereas one would not expect this fluency to affect people’s
abilities to recall unrelated contextual information from the
Study phase.
The majority of studies combining masked primes with R/
K judgments, such as Rajaram’s (1993) original study, have
used repetition primes. Priming effects on familiarity in these
studies are typically attributed to increased perceptual fluency,
despite the fact that repetition primes and targets, though the
same word, are often presented in different case or font; i.e.,
are perceptually only similar, and only identical at higher
levels of representation (e.g., orthographic, phonological,
conceptual, etc.). A later study of Rajaram and Geraci (2000)
used semantic primes (e.g., sugar-SWEET, author-BOOK) and
found the same priming-related increase in K but not R
judgments, suggesting that the familiarity signal arises at the
level of conceptual (rather than perceptual, orthographic, or
phonological) fluency. However, because Rajaram and Gera-
ci’s prime-target pairs were also associatively relateddi.e.,
targets were high-probability free-associates of primesdit is
possible that the increase in familiarity was due to lexical
rather than conceptual fluency. Although many associated
words are also conceptually related, as indeed Rajaram and
Geraci’s were, associative probability is influenced by non-
conceptual factors such as the probability of co-occurrence
in language (e.g., hobby-HORSE, grand-PIANO), and in
semantic priming studies, association tends to dominate over
conceptual relatedness (Lucas, 2000).
In a recent study (Taylor and Henson, in press), we used
semantically related primes (that share semantic attributes,
e.g., piano-GUITAR) that were not associatively related, in an
attempt to isolate the effect of conceptual fluency on recog-
nition memory judgments. When we included these so-called
conceptual primes with the standard repetition primes used
inmost previous studies (with different blocks for each prime-
type), we found that they produced the opposite effect: i.e.,
Conceptual primes increased the likelihood of (correct) R but
not K judgments.1 This occurred simultaneously with the
standard increase in K but not R judgments following repeti-
tion primes, producing a reliable cross-over interaction
between prime-type and R/K judgment.
While this cross-over interaction might be used to support
at least two distinct contributions to recognition memory,
such as recollection and familiarity, the interpretation of the
increased R judgments following conceptual primes would
appear more difficult to reconcile with conventional theories
of recollection. Indeed, as noted above, one popular theory of
recollection and familiarity associates conceptual fluency
with familiarity, not recollection (Yonelinas, 2002).1 We actually used the judgment label “Familiar” rather than
“Know”, because in a number of studies, we have found that
some participants are confused by the greater confidence implied
by colloquial usage of “know” compared with “remember”.
Nonetheless, we maintain the “K” (and hence “R/K”) label in this
paper for consistency with previous studies.One possibility is that conceptual primes automatically
activate concepts that are semantically related to both the
prime and target (test item), consistent with behavioral
evidence for subliminal semantic priming (Van den Bussche
et al., 2009). If some of these concepts were also generated
spontaneously at Study (particularly if the encoding task
entails semantic elaboration), then their unconscious activa-
tion at Test may increase the probability of retrieving them in
response to the test cue (i.e., increase retrieval of internal
source; the type of source that is likely to dominate R judg-
ments in experiments like these that use word lists, where
there is little variability in external source information). In
support of this hypothesis, the increase in R judgments
following conceptual primes occurred only for studied items
(Hits), not unstudied items (False Alarms), unlike the typical
pattern for repetition primes (that increase bothHits and False
Alarms, given a K judgment) e see Taylor and Henson (in
press) for further discussion.
However, another possibility is that this interaction
pattern is an artifact of the standard R/K procedure, in that
participants are forced to give either an R judgment or a K
judgment (i.e., the response categories are mutually exclu-
sive). Thus if participants experience two different types of
fluency within an experiment (stemming from repetition
versus conceptual primes), then they may feel obliged to
attribute one to “knowing” and one to “remembering”. While
this account does not explain why conceptual primes lead
specifically to R judgments (and only for studied items), it
might explain why we have not yet found reliable evidence of
increased R judgments in experiments that use conceptual
primes only (i.e., with no repetition primes in other blocks;
Taylor and Henson, in press). More importantly, this account
is consistent with other experiments that have used the
Jacoby and Whitehouse paradigm, but asked for independent
ratings of both Remembering and Knowing on each trial (e.g.,
using a 1e4 scale for each; an alternative procedure intro-
duced by Higham and Vokey, 2004). These experiments, by
Kurilla and Westerman (2008), and Brown and Bodner (2011),
replicated the finding that masked repetition primes only
affect K judgments under the standard (exclusive) R/K proce-
dure, but found that they affected both R and K ratings under
the independent ratings procedure. In other words, even
masked repetition primes (not just conceptual primes) appear
to increase participants’ experiences of Remembering, as long
as participants are allowed to rate this independently of their
experience of Knowing.
If one hypothesizes that the processes of recollection and
familiarity are mutually exclusive (e.g., Gardiner et al., 1998,
2002), then the use of binary R/K response categories follows
naturally; however, if one believes that recollection and
familiarity are independent or redundant (e.g., Knowlton and
Squire, 1995; Mayes et al., 2007), then the interpretation of
binary R/K responses becomes less straightforward. In the
latter case, measures such as “independence” K scores (the
proportion of trials not given an R response that were given a K
response; Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1995) may be computed in
order to estimate recollection and familiarity from binary R/K
responses. Nonetheless, the critical concern here is the signal
sent to the participant by the use of binary response categoriese
that Remembering and Knowing are mutually-exclusive
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statistically.
One alternative way to test these mappings is to look for
convergent evidence from neuroimaging. A large number of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments
have investigated the brain regions associated with many
different operationalizations of recollection and familiarity:
Not just using R/K judgments, but also using objective tests of
source retrieval, confidence ratings, and other means. A
notably consistent set of regions has emerged in relation to
recollection, viz regions in medial and lateral parietal cortex
(Wagner et al., 2005) and in the hippocampus (Diana et al.,
2007). In the present paradigm, if conceptual primes truly
increase recollection of internal source, as in the first possi-
bility outlined above, then they should affect the fMRI signal
in these “recollection” regions.
We therefore conducted a replication of our prior behavioral
experiment using conceptual and repetition primes in an R/K
paradigm (Taylor and Henson, in press) in combination with
fMRI. For the fMRI data, differences between the various trial-
types (as a function of R/K/New judgments and prime-type)
were explored in a whole-brain analysis. Second, as a more
sensitive test of the hypothesis above, we identified functional
regions of interest (fROIs) sensitive to recollection (R > K
contrast) or to familiarity (K> Correct Rejections (CR) contrast),
and tested for (orthogonal) priming effects in those fROIs.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were recruited from the volunteer panel of the
MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, or from the student
population of Cambridge University; all participants had
normal or corrected to normal vision and were right-handed
(self-report). Experiments were of the type approved by a
local research ethics committee (Local Research Ethics
Committee reference 05/Q0108/401). A total of 22 participants
(15 female) gave informed consent to participate in the fMRI
experiment, with a mean age of 25.77 (SD ¼ 4.57) years.
2.2. Materials
The stimuli (identical to those used in Taylor and Henson, in
press) consisted of 480 word-pairs (“prime”-“TARGET”) that
were conceptually related but not lexically associated
according to word-generation norms (both forward and
backward association probabilities <.10 in the University of
South Florida norms; Nelson et al., 1998: http://www.usf.edu/
FreeAssociation/). Conceptual relatedness was defined on the
basis of taxonomic category (e.g., pianoeGUITAR, horsee
COW), attributes or functions (e.g., silvereCOIN, teapoteBOIL),
typical context (e.g., pondeFROG, weddingeBRIDE), part-
whole relationship (e.g., tobaccoeCIGAR, cameraeLENS), or
lexical interchangeability (e.g., biscuiteCOOKIE, shop-
eBOUTIQUE). All primes and targets were between three and
eight letters long (primes:M¼ 5.26, SD¼ 1.12; targetsM¼ 5.44,
SD ¼ 1.38) and had written frequencies between 1 and 150 per
million (primes: M ¼ 33.97, SD ¼ 26.00; targets M ¼ 34.14,SD ¼ 36.08; Kucera and Francis, 1967). These conceptually
related prime-target pairs comprised the Primed condition for
Conceptual Priming trials; two further lists were created by re-
pairing each target with itself (Primed condition, Repetition
Priming trials) or with an unrelated prime via a pseudo-
random shuffle (Unprimed conditions for both Conceptual
and Repetition Priming trials). These lists were each further
sub-divided into four Sets (AeD), to be used in the counter-
balancing described in Procedure, below.
2.3. Procedure
The main experiment consisted of two trial types, Study and
Test. On Study trials, participants made “interestingness”
judgments (based on our previous studies, e.g., Woollams
et al., 2008): A word (in upper case) was presented at the
center of the screen (duration 300 msec) and participants read
the word silently and indicated whether it was interesting or
not by pressing one of two buttons. The word was preceded by
a central fixation cross for one of 400, 600, or 800 msec
(selected from a random uniform distribution) and followed
by a blank screen for 1000 msec.
On Test trials, participants performed a yes/no recognition
task: They read a centrally presented word (see Fig. 1 for
stimulus timing) and first indicated whether they thought it
had (old ) or had not (new) appeared previously in a Study trial.
If they responded “old”, they were then prompted to decide
whether they remembered seeing the test cue (“R” judgment) or
whether they simply felt that the item was familiar (“K”
judgment; instructions are described below). Note that we
used the label “familiar”, rather than the traditional “know”
judgment, for reasons given in Footnote 1. Response times
(RTs) were recorded; however, accuracy was emphasized over
speed. If the participant responded “new” to the test cue, or if
they failed to respond (time limit¼ 2000msec), then theywere
prompted (“Left/Right”) to randomly press one of the response
keys. This helped match the timing and motor demands of
“old” and “new” trials (over which the fMRI response aver-
ages). Critically, each test cue (“target”) was preceded by
a brief, masked prime word. In the Conceptual Priming
condition, the prime and target were either conceptually
related or unrelated; in the Repetition Priming condition, the
prime and target were either the same word or unrelated
words, as described in Stimuli, above. Primes were presented
in lower case and targets in upper case, to minimize visual
overlap on Repetition priming trials.
Before entering the MRI scanner, participants were given
task instructions and completed a brief practice session (eight
Study and 16 Test trials). The instructions, based on Rajaram
(1993), described the Remember/Familiar distinction as
follows: “RespondREMEMBER ifyourecollect theeventofseeing
the word, some aspect of the context (how the word looked,
what it made you think or feel, etc.). Respond FAMILIAR if you
are certain you saw the word previously but you cannot recol-
lect any contextual details.” At the end of the practice trials,
participants were asked to recall the instructions and explain
the difference between the Remember and Familiar response
categories; any confusion was resolved by repeating the rele-
vant part of the instructions. For example, if the participant
seemed to equate Remember/Familiar responseswithhigh/low
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Familiar responses were possible, such as when one is sure
the word was presented previously but no contextual details of
the event of seeing the word could be recalled.
The experiment consisted of four cycles of interleaved
Study and Test blocks, all conducted during functional MRI
scanning. Each Study block (duration: approximately 2.5 min)
consisted of 60 trials (order randomized for each participant)
plus two “dummy” trials at the end (ignored in analysis) to
prevent recency effects. Each Test phase (duration: approxi-
mately 11 min) consisted of 120 trials (50% ¼ 60 trials/block
“studied” words from the previous Study phase, 50%
“unstudied” words that had not been presented in the
experiment; order randomized for each participant) plus two
“practice” trials at the beginning (unstudied words; ignored in
analysis). One half of studied trials and one half of unstudied
trials were preceded by related primes; the other halves were
preceded by unrelated primes. The Conceptual and Repetition
priming conditions were blocked such that two consecutive
Test phases contained either Conceptual primes or Repetition
primes. No word was repeated across blocks.
Block Order (Repetition/Conceptual Priming first) and
Set-Condition mapping (A/B/C/D/ Repetition/Conceptual 
Primed/Unprimed) were counterbalanced across participants,
with a total cycle of eight participants. Stimuli were back-
projected (60 Hz refresh rate; 1024  768 pixels) onto a screen
behind the MRI scanner that participants viewed through a
mirror. Words were presented in white on a black background.
Responses were made with right and left index fingers, with
finger-response mappings separately counterbalanced across
participants for the Interestingness, Old/New, and R/K tasks.
On completion of the main experiment, subjective and
objective measures of prime awareness/visibility were
collected. Participants were asked whether they noticed any
“hiddenwords” (i.e., themasked primes) in the procedure, and
whether they had been able to identify any of these words
(subjective measures). The nature of the experiment, and in
particular of the masked primes, was then explained. Partic-
ipants then performed a Prime Visibility Test, in which 120
test trials were shown as during the experiment (fixation,
forward mask, prime, backward mask, test cue), and partici-
pants were asked to indicate which of three (equally likely to
be correct across trials) candidate words had been the prime
on that trial. The three candidate primes were (a) the same
word as the target (i.e., the Repetition prime), (b) a conceptu-
ally related word (i.e., the Conceptual prime), and (c) an
unrelated word (Unprimed condition). Participants were
encouraged to guess if they didn’t see the prime.
2.4. Behavioral analyses
Recollection and familiarity were estimated from proportions
of trials given “remember” and “familiar” judgments under
independence assumptions (“IRK”; Yonelinas and Jacoby,
1995), where recollection ¼ R/N and familiarity ¼ K/(NeR);
R ¼ number of R judgments; K ¼ number of K judgments and
N ¼ total number of test trials. Separate estimates were made
for studied (i.e., hits) and unstudied (i.e., Correct Rejection)
trials, and for each priming condition. These estimates were
analyzed using amultifactorial repeated-measures analysis ofvariance (ANOVA). The purpose of using this IRK scoring was
to allow Memory Judgment (R, K) to be used as a factor in the
same ANOVA, given that interactions between Priming and
Memory Judgmentwere of primary interest. Significant effects
are only reported in the absence of significant higher-order
interactions. All statistical tests had alpha set at .05, and
a GreenhouseeGeisser correction was applied to all F-values
with more than one degree of freedom in the numerator.
Follow-on T-tests were two-tailed, except where stated
otherwise. An ANOVA on RTs to the first (old/new) decision
was also conducted, though note that participants’ responses
were not speeded, so any RT effects (and in particular their
absence) should be interpreted with caution.
2.5. fMRI methods
2.5.1. fMRI acquisition
Thirty-two T2*-weighted transverse slices (64  64
3 mm  3 mm pixels, TE ¼ 30 msec, flip-angle ¼ 78) per
volume were taken using Echo-Planar Imaging (EPI) on a 3T
TIM Trio system (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). Slices were 3-
mm thick with a .75 mm gap, tilted up approximately 30 at
the front to minimize eye-ghosting, and acquired in
descending order. Eight sessions were acquired, equating to
the four study-test cycles. Seventy-six volumes were acquired
during each Study phase, 340 were acquired during each Test
phase, with a repetition time (TR) of 2000 msec. The first five
volumes of each session were discarded to allow for equilib-
rium effects. A T1-weighted structural volume was also
acquired for each participant with 1  1  1 mm voxels using
Magnetisation Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) and
Generalized Autocalibrating Partially Parallel Acquisition
(GRAPPA) and GRAPPA parallel imaging (flip-angle ¼ 9;
TE¼ 2.00 sec; acceleration factor¼ 2). fMRI data were acquired
during all phases of the experiment; analyses presented here
are limited to Test Phase data.
2.5.2. fMRI analyses
fMRI data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM5, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm5.html). The EPI
volumes were realigned spatially to correct for movement,
and then the data within each slice were realigned temporally
to match acquisition of the middle slice. The mean EPI across
realigned volumes was then coregistered to the T1 image,
which was normalized to MNI space, using a unified
segmentation and normalization algorithm (Ashburner and
Friston, 2005); the resulting normalization parameters were
then applied to all of the EPI images, which were resampled to
3  3  3 mm voxels. Finally, the normalized EPI images were
smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel with 8 mm full
width at half maximum (FWHM; final smoothness approxi-
mately 10  10  10 mm).
Statistical analysis was performed in a two-stage approx-
imation to a Mixed Effects model. In the first stage, neural
activity was modeled by a delta function at stimulus onset.
The BOLD response was modeled by a convolution of these
delta functions by a canonical Hemodynamic Response
Function (HRF). The resulting time-courses were down-
sampled at the midpoint of each scan to form regressors in
a General Linear Model.
Table 1 e Behavioral data: Mean (minemax range) percentage of trials for each type of Prime (Conceptual vs Repetition,/60)
that were given each type of Memory Judgment (R, K, New) for each Prime Status (Primed, Unprimed) and Study Status
(Studied, Unstudied).
Memory
judgment
Conceptual Repetition
Studied Unstudied Studied Unstudied
Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed
R 62.1
(28.3e96.7)
57.3
(21.7e100)
3.6
(0.0e16.7)
3.7
(0.0e21.7)
61.6
(11.7e95.0)
60.8
(10.0e93.3)
3.3
(0.0e11.7)
2.6
(0.0e13.3)
K 16.9
(0.0e51.7)
18.9
(0.0e51.7)
12.6
(0.0e33.3)
15.5
(0.0e38.3)
16.7
(0.0e41.7)
17.2
(0.0e43.3)
21.8
(3.3e51.7)
12.2
(0.0e33.3)
New 18.4
(1.7e40.0)
22.0
(0.0e53.3)
82.6
(51.7e98.3)
79.4
(46.7e100)
19.3
(1.7e66.7)
20.2
(0.0e71.7)
74.2
(36.7e93.3)
84.5
(53.3e98.3)
2 An analysis of priming for K without independence assump-
tions produced the same pattern of results: Masked Conceptual
primes did not affect K judgments [t(21) ¼ 1.75, p ¼ .09]; whereas
masked Repetition primes increased K judgments [t(21) ¼ 2.61,
p < .05].
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responding to six types of response (R Hits, R Misses, K Hits,
K Misses, Correct Rejections, False Alarms) for each of
Primed and Unprimed trials (the manipulation of Repetition
versus Conceptual Prime-Types was across sessions). To
account for (linear) residual artifacts after realignment, the
model also included six further regressors representing the
movement parameters estimated during realignment.
Voxel-wise parameter estimates for these regressors were
obtained by Restricted Maximum-Likelihood (ReML) estima-
tion, using a temporal high-pass filter (cut-off 128 sec) to
remove low-frequency drifts, and modeling temporal auto-
correlation across scans with an AR (1) process (Friston et al.,
2002).
2.5.2.1. WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSES. Voxel-wise contrasts of the
parameter estimates for each of the 12 event-types of
interest, conforming to the 3  2  2 design of Memory
Judgment (R Hits, K Hits, Correct Rejections)  Priming
Type (Repetition, Conceptual)  Prime Status (Primed,
Unprimed), were estimated by a weighted average (vsbase-
line) across each of the two sessions per Prime Type,
weighted by the number of events of that type across those
two sessions. The resulting contrast images comprised the
data for a second-stage model, which treated participants as
a random effect. Within this model, Statistical Parametric
Maps (SPMs) were created of the T-statistic for the various
effects of interest, using a single pooled error estimate for all
contrasts, whose nonsphericity was estimated using ReML
as described in Friston et al. (2002). The SPMs were thresh-
olded for at least five contiguous voxels whose statistic
exceeded a peak threshold corresponding to one-tailed
p < .05 family-wise error-corrected across the whole space
using Random Field Theory (RFT). Stereotactic coordinates
of the maxima within the thresholded SPMs correspond to
the MNI template.
2.5.2.2. fROI analyses. To provide a more sensitive test of
possible priming effects, the same 3  2  2 ANOVA was
conducted on data from the peak voxel within each fROI
defined in whole-brain comparisons of Memory Judgment. As
themain effect of Memory Judgment is biased by the selection
of voxels, only effects involving Prime Status or Priming Type
factors are reported.3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results
3.1.1. Priming and memory judgments
The mean proportions of responses in each condition are
shown in Table 1. For R judgments, overall accuracy (Pr[Hit-
FA]) was .56 in Conceptual Priming and .58 in Repetition
Priming blocks, both significantly greater than zero,
t(21)s > 10.0, ps < .001. For independent scoring of K judg-
ments (see Methods), accuracy was .29 in Conceptual Priming
and .31 in Repetition Priming blocks, both of which were also
significantly above chance, t(21)s > 5.5, p < .001, suggesting
that K judgments were not simply guesses.
For “old” judgments, the 2 (Memory Judgment) 2 (Priming
Type)  2 (Study Status)  2 (Prime Status) ANOVA revealed
several significant 3-way interactions, each involving the
Prime Status factor (i.e., priming effects). Most importantly,
the Priming Type  Memory Judgment  Prime Status inter-
action, F(1,21) ¼ 5.05, p ¼ .035, indicated that the pattern of R-
and K-priming effects differed between Conceptual and
Repetition Priming blocks. Follow-up t-tests on priming score
(Primed-Unprimed) showed that masked Conceptual primes
increased R judgments [t(21) ¼ 2.13, p < .05] but not K judg-
ments [t(21) ¼ 1.53, p ¼ .14], whereas masked Repetition
primes increased K judgments [t(21) ¼ 2.52, p ¼ .02] but not R
judgments [t(21)¼ .57, p¼ .57].2 This cross-over interaction, as
shown in Fig. 2, replicates our previous behavioral experiment
(Taylor and Henson, in press).
Further three-way interactions were found for Priming
Type  Study Status  Prime Status, F(1,21) ¼ 18.9, p < .001,
and for Memory Judgment  Study Status  Prime Status
F(1,21) ¼ 8.52, p ¼ .008. These effects together indicated that
the pattern of R- and K-priming effects differed between
Studied (Hits) and Unstudied (FAs) items. Follow-up t-tests on
priming score revealed that Conceptual primes increased R
Hits [t(21) ¼ 2.47, p < .05] but not R FAs (t < 1), whereas
Fig. 2 e Behavioral priming effects. Priming score (percentage of trials for Primed-Unprimed, under independence
assumptions) is shown as a function of Memory Judgment (R e red, K e green) and Priming Type (Conceptual, Repetition),
while superimposed hatched bars show further split by Hits versus False Alarms. Error bars reflect standard error of the
mean priming effect.
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not K Hits (t < 1).3
3.1.2. RT
Median RTs for correct “old” (Hit) and “new” (CR) decisions
(there were too few False Alarms and Misses to include
these) were analyzed in a 2  3  2 ANOVA with factors
Priming Type (Conceptual, Repetition), Memory Judgment
(R, K, CR), and Prime Status (Primed, Unprimed). Participants
were excluded from the analysis if they had an insufficient
number of trials in each cell of the design, using the same
criteria as in the fMRI analysis (see section 3.2.1 below), i.e.,
the same sample of 18 participants used in fMRI Results.
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Memory Judgment,
F(1.89,32.19)¼ 11.1, p< .001, and follow-up t-tests showed that
RTs to correct “old” decisions subsequently given an R judg-
ment (M ¼ 752 msec, SD ¼ 98) were significantly faster than
those subsequently given a K judgment (M ¼ 865 msec,
SD ¼ 195), t(17) ¼ 4.27, p < .01. Such Rs were also significantly
faster than CRs (M ¼ 808 msec, SD ¼ 151), t(17) ¼ 2.38, p < .05,
and CRs were faster than Ks, t(17) ¼ 2.64, p < .05. The main
effect of Prime Status was not significant (F < 1); however, the
interaction between Memory Judgment and Prime Status was
significant, F(1.98,33.6) ¼ 4.26, p < .05, and follow-up t-tests
showed that the priming effect (Primed-Unprimed, collapsed
across Conceptual and Repetition blocks) was significantly
larger for R (M ¼ 35 msec) than for CR (M ¼ 9 msec),
t(17) ¼ 2.98, p < .01, and nearly significantly larger than the
priming effect for K (M¼ 3msec), t(17)¼ 1.97, p¼ .065. Only the
priming effect on Rs was significantly greater than zero,
t(17) ¼ 4.65, p < .001.3 For non-independence K: Masked Repetition primes increased
K FAs [t(21) ¼ 4.27, p < .001] but not K Hits (t < 1).3.1.3. Prime Visibility Test
Nine of the 22 participants (41%) reported being aware that
there were “hidden” words in the experiment; only one of
these “aware” participants reported being able to identify
prime words on some trials. In the Prime Visibility Test, mean
performance was 58.7% (SD ¼ 16.5), which was significantly
better than chance (33%), t(21) ¼ 7.30, p < .001. However,
performance varied greatly between priming conditions (one-
way ANOVA with factor Prime Type: Conceptual, Repetition,
Unrelated; F(1.47,30.8) ¼ 13.0, p < .001). Participants identified
both Unrelated (M ¼ 67.6%, SD ¼ 27.1) and Conceptual
(M ¼ 74.5%, SD ¼ 19.8) primes with greater accuracy than
Repetition primes (M ¼ 34.0%, SD ¼ 35.8), t(21)s > 3.4, ps < .01.
Indeed, prime identification accuracy did not significantly
differ from chance for Repetition primes, t(21) ¼ 1.30, p ¼ .21,
but was greater than chance for both Conceptual and Unre-
lated primes, t(21)s > 5, ps < .001.3.2. fMRI results
3.2.1. Whole-brain analyses
The fMRI data of four participants were excluded (leaving 18)
because they did not produce at least one event of each of the
12 event-types of interest (conforming to the 3 2 2 design of
Memory Judgment: R Hits/K Hits/Correct Rejections  Priming
Type: Repetition/Conceptual  Prime Status: Primed/
Unprimed, as also used for RTs above), precluding estimation
of BOLD responses in those conditions (see ranges in Table 1).
We started with directional, pairwise T-contrasts of different
Memory Judgments, in order to replicate previous fMRI studies
using R/K judgments (e.g., Henson et al., 1999; Eldridge et al.,
2000). The results are shown in Table 2.
The regions showing significantly greater activity for R Hits
than K Hits are shown in red in Fig. 3, whereas regions
Table 2 e Clusters and their peaks for main contrasts of Memory Judgment, p< .05 FWE whole-brain corrected. Within
each cluster, total cluster volume (voxels) and coordinates of the global peak are shown in bold; coordinates of any local
peaksmore than 8mmapart are listed beneath in regular font weight. Note: no voxels survived correction for contrast of K
Hit> R Hit.
Region Voxels MNI Coordinates Z-score
X Y Z
R Hit > K Hit
Left inferior parietal 245 L48 L57 D36 6.15
36 69 þ36 5.85
Bilateral medial parietal
Posterior cingulate
244 D12 L45 D33 5.67
9 45 þ30 5.02
6 30 þ42 5.02
9 69 þ33 5.48
Right inferior parietal 18 D39 L66 D30 5.06
K Hit > R Hit (nothing)
K Hit > CR
Left superior parietal 33 L39 L51 D45 5.52
Left medial parietal 25 L9 L69 D36 6.17
Bilateral anterior cingulate 188 L6 D24 D42 6.99
Left anterior insula 67 L30 D21 L3 6.47
Right anterior insula 22 D33 D21 L9 5.52
CR > K Hit
Left anterior hippocampus 8 L27 L9 L18 5.13
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green. As expected from previous studies, R-related activity
occurred in medial and lateral parietal cortex, particularly
bilateral posterior cingulate and inferior parietal gyri respec-
tively (no voxels survived correction in the hippocampi;
though see fROI results below). Greater activity for K Hits than
Correct Rejections, on the other hand, includedmore posterior
regions of medial parietal cortex andmore superior regions of
lateral parietal cortex, consistent with the review of Wagner
et al. (2005), as well as bilateral anterior cingulate and ante-
rior insulae. These K > CR regions were generally activated by
Hits, regardless of R or K judgment (see fROI results below,
Fig. 5C).
For the reverse contrasts, no region showed significantly
greater activity for K Hits than R Hits. However one region, in
left anterior hippocampus, showed significantly greater
activity for Correct Rejections than KHits (at a lower statistical
threshold, a homologous region in the right hippocampus was
also revealed; see Fig. 4). This is consistent with the “novelty”
response often seen in hippocampus with fMRI (Daselaar
et al., 2006; Ko¨hler et al., 2005; Yassa and Stark, 2008),
though its full response pattern was more complex (see fROI
analysis below).
We also tested using F-contrasts the various main effects
and interactions involving Prime Status and Priming Type in
the 2  2  3 ANOVA design. However, no voxels survived
corrections for multiple comparisons across the whole-brain.
Therefore, we next focused on fROI defined by the above
contrasts of R Hits, K Hits and Correct Rejections.
3.2.2. fROI results
To provide a more sensitive test of possible priming effects,
we repeated the 2  2  3 ANOVA on data from the peak voxel
within each fROI defined in the whole-brain comparisons
of Memory Judgment above. The main effect of MemoryJudgment is, of course, biased by the selection of voxels, so we
only report on effects involving Prime Status or Priming Type
factors.
For the three fROIs that weremore active for R Hits> KHits
(Table 2), two (in left and right inferior parietal cortex) showed
a significant interaction between Priming Type and Prime
Status [F(1,17)s > 5.3, ps < .05], while the third (in posterior
cingulate cortex) showed a trend in the same direction
[F(1,17) ¼ 3.27, p ¼ .09]. No other effects of interest reached
significance. When including fROI as an additional factor, the
Priming Type and Prime Status was again significant
[F(1,17) ¼ 6.90, p < .05], as was a main effect of Priming Type
[F(1,17) ¼ 7.01, p < .05], but no other effects reached signifi-
cance, including any interactions with fROI.
The associated BOLD signal changes, averaged across these
parietal “remember fROIs” are shown in Fig. 5AeB. Fig. 5A
shows the effects of Memory Judgment for each Priming Type
(averaged across Prime Status), though note that these plots
are for illustrative rather than inferential purposes, given the
prior selection of these fROIs as showing (part of) an effect of
Memory Judgment (Kriegeskorte et al., 2010). From this figure,
it can be seen that while these regions distinguish R Hits from
the other judgment types, there is little evidence for a differ-
ence between K Hits and Correct Rejections (i.e., these parietal
regions seemed interested specifically in R judgments).
Fig. 5B, on the other hand, shows the effects of Priming
Type on the priming effect, separately for R and K Hits (anal-
ogous to the format of behavioral priming effects used in
Fig. 2, but only for trials correctly identified as “old”, i.e., Hits).
This figure, which is not biased by selection by the orthogonal
main effect of Memory Judgment, demonstrates opposite
effects of Repetition and Conceptual priming on the BOLD
signal in the “Remember ROIs”, corresponding to the signifi-
cant interaction between Priming Type and Prime Status in
the above fROI ANOVAs. Unlike the behavioral data, however,
Fig. 3 e Rendering of regions showing greater BOLD signal for R Hits than K Hits (red) and for K Hits than CRs (green) at
p< .05 corrected for a whole-brain search, shown on left and right views (upper row) and posterior view (lower image) of
the surface of a canonical brain in MNI space (slightly inflated in the lower image in order to help visualization of activity in
medial sulci).
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Memory Judgment (i.e., does not differ for R and K),4 though it
is worth noting that only the increased response for Primed
relative to Unprimed Conceptual trials is independently
significant [t(17) ¼ 1.78, p < .05], which may relate to the
behavioral increase for Conceptual priming that was specific
to R judgments (Fig. 2). Indeed, even more strikingly, the
Conceptual priming effect for R in these regions correlated
significantly with behavioral priming of R judgments, r ¼ .59,
p ¼ .01, whereas no such correlation was found between
behavioral and BOLD K-priming effects in these “Remember”
regions (consistent with expectation), r ¼ .02, p ¼ .92 (Fig. 6).
For the five fROIs that weremore active for K Hits> Correct
Rejections (Table 2), only one showed a significant effect
involving Priming Type or Prime Status, and this was the fROI
in right anterior insula, which showed a significant main4 The numerically larger Conceptual priming effect for K than
for R, and associated large standard error, was driven by a single
outlier (value: 2.38; see Figs. 5B, 6B), and removal of this outlier
reduced the K effect from .14 to .01 (whereas R changed from .10
to .09), producing a pattern consistent with the behavioral results
(i.e., conceptual priming of R but not K). However, removal of this
outlier based on the data of interest would be circular, and the
participant was not an outlier on other (independent) measures.effect of Prime Status [F(1,17) > 5.1, p < .05], though this may
be a Type I error given the number of ANOVA effects and fROIs
tested. More importantly, when averaging across these five
“familiarity fROIs”, no effects involving Prime Status or
Priming Type reached significance (Fs < 2.47, ps > .14). Thus
these regions seemed to care only about the Memory Judg-
ment, as shown for illustrative purposes in Fig. 5C, fromwhich
it appears that these regions distinguish Hits from Correct
Rejections, regardless of whether Hits are associated with R of
K judgments.
Finally, for the single left hippocampal fROI that was more
active for Correct Rejections than K Hits, the ANOVA showed
no significant effects involving Prime Status or Priming Type
except a main effect of Priming Type [F(1,17) ¼ 7.90, p < .05],
which reflected greater overall activity in Conceptual Priming
than in Repetition Priming blocks (Fig. 5D).5 Interestingly, and5 Given that the Unprimed conditions of Repetition and
Conceptual Prime Types do not differ logically, this main effect of
Priming Type, in the absence of an interaction with Prime Status,
is difficult to interpret. It could reflect a “state” effect e i.e.,
a difference in the way that both primed and unprimed trials are
processed as a function of the nature of the priming block e or it
may simply be a type I error. In either case, we do deem it worthy
of further discussion here.
Fig. 4 e Sections through a canonical T1-weighted image in MNI space showing hippocampal regions that demonstrated
greater BOLD signal for CRs than K Hits at p< .001 uncorrected for display purposes (maximum in left hippocampus
survives p< .05 corrected for the whole-brain).
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procedure in our laboratory, this anterior hippocampal region
showed a pattern across Memory Judgments that appeared to
differ from both of the above two types of fROI: a “U-shaped”
pattern such that the hippocampus was most active for
Correct Rejections and RHits relative to K Hits. An explanation
for this pattern is given in the Discussion.4. Discussion
In a previous behavioral study (Taylor and Henson, in press),
we found that masked conceptual primes increase the
number of R but not K judgments, whereas masked repetition
primes produce the opposite pattern, increasing K but not R
judgments. If the effect of conceptual priming on R reflects
a genuine influence of conceptual primes on recollection,
rather than an artifact of the binary response demands of the
R/K procedure (Brown and Bodner, 2011; Kurilla and
Westerman, 2008), then conceptual priming would be ex-
pected to modulate activity in neural regions that support
recollection. In the present fMRI study, we replicated the
behavioral finding that conceptual priming increases R judg-
ments, and further, we found that conceptual priming did
indeed modulate BOLD responses in medial and lateral pari-
etal regions that were sensitive to recollection (identified via a
whole-brain contrast of R Hits > K Hits), and that the magni-
tude of parietal fROI priming effects correlated withbehavioral priming effects across participants. In what
follows, we expand some details and alternative interpreta-
tions of the behavioral and fMRI results, integrate the fMRI
results with those of previous studies of recognition memory,
and finally, present some potential caveats concerning the
present analyses.
4.1. Masked conceptual primes and recollection
While the cross-over interaction between conceptual versus
repetition primes and R versus K judgments on behavioral
priming (the difference in number of R/K judgments for
primed versus unprimed trials) replicates our previous results
(Taylor and Henson, in press), there were a few differences in
the precise pattern. Firstly, the effect of repetition primes on
K judgments was significantly greater for False Alarms than
Hits e indeed, did not reach significance for Hits alone e
whereas in our previous experiment, the effect was significant
for both Hits and False Alarms (Taylor and Henson, in press).
We have previously found a trend for a greater effect of repe-
tition primes on K-False Alarms than K Hits (Woollams et al.,
2008), but an informal review of published results using the
Jacoby and Whitehouse paradigm would suggest that repeti-
tion primes affect studied as well as unstudied items, in which
case, our present lack of effect on K Hits is likely to be a Type II
error.
A second detail concerned a difference between the
behavioral and fMRI results: Whereas there was a greater
A B
C D
Fig. 5 e Plots of mean BOLD signal change for significant ANOVA effects averaged across ROIs in Figs. 2, 3. Note: effect of
Memory Judgment in panels A, C and D is illustrative only, since voxel maxima were selected after searching many voxels
for a reliable difference between two of the three conditions Memory Judgments (Kriegeskorte et al., 2010), but this does not
bias the orthogonal effect of priming shown in panel B.
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primed relative to unprimed trials, there was no such inter-
action between Memory Judgment and Priming Type in the
BOLD signal in the “recollection” fROIs. Rather, the pattern
across these parietal fROIs in Fig. 5B reflected a significant
conceptual priming effect for R judgments, but a conceptual
priming effect that was numerically larger, but just not
significant, for K judgments (though this conceptual-K effect
appeared to be driven by an outlier; see Footnote 4). This lack of
a significant interaction in the fMRI data is probably the
weakest part of the present argument that conceptual primes
selectively increase recollection, so would deserve replication,
with greater power (e.g., greater number of K judgments).
Indeed, more generally, the incidence of R judgments (63% of
all trials) was slightly higher than we expected on the basis of
previous experiments (cf. 58% in Taylor and Henson, in press;
52% in Woollams et al., 2008), likely reducing the incidence of
K judgments, and possibly reflecting an atypical sample (or a
facilitatory effect on attention/memory of being in an
MRI scanner!). Importantly, however, the finding that the
correlation between the sizes of behavioral and fMRI concep-
tual “priming” across participants was significant for R judg-
ments, but not for K judgments, reinforces a role of the parietalregions in conceptual priming that is specific to recollection
(given that the significance of this correlation is independent
of the presence or absence of any mean priming effects on R
and/or K judgments).
The findings of conceptual priming effects in parietal fROI
responses to R judgments, and in particular, the correlation
of these BOLD effects and behavioral priming effects across
participants, support the hypothesis that such primes
increase recollection, but they do not speak to the particular
cognitive mechanism(s) that underlie this effect. The medial
and lateral parietal regions that were activated by our
comparison of R versus K judgments have also been previ-
ously associated with recollection using a variety of para-
digms, including source retrieval, not just the Remember/
Know paradigm (Wagner et al., 2005). One possibility we
have proposed (Taylor and Henson, in press; also raised in
the Introduction above) is that conceptual primes sublimi-
nally reactivate semantically related information that had
been spontaneously generated at Study, thereby increasing
the probability of retrieval of “internal” source (Johnson
et al., 1993). Such reactivation of internal source informa-
tion could explain why the effect of conceptual primes is
restricted to studied items (Hits), contrary to fluency-
Fig. 6 e Plots of behavioral priming scores (Primed-
Unprimed) for correct “old” judgments (Hits; under
independence assumptions) against BOLD priming effects
(Primed-Unprimed) averaged across R Hit> K Hit fROIs for
R (Panel A) and K (Panel B) judgments. Note the outlier in
Panel B (see Footnote 4).
6 The recollection hypothesis also seems difficult to reconcile
with previous demonstrations that associatively related primes,
rather than the present semantically related primes, increase K
rather than R judgments (Rajaram and Geraci, 2000). Such strong
associates of target words would also seem likely to be generated
at study, though this is likely to depend on the precise study task
(explicit memorization in Rajaram and Geraci, 2000). Note
however that the semantic primes used by Rajaram and Geraci
(2000) were not masked, so were likely to be clearly visible to
participants (unlike here), which may well have affected how the
participants attributed any conceptual fluency, and hence also
possibly explain this difference between our and their study.
7 Though the type of study task may also affect the extent to
which source information is “unitized” with the target item:
When the study task enables such unitization, the effect of
conceptual primes may be experienced as familiarity rather than
recollection (Kurilla, 2011).
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increase in K responses (Hits and False Alarms) following
repetition primes. Further support for this hypothesis awaits
future study.
It should be noted that a recollection-based interpretation
of the parietal fROI results is neither necessary nor sufficient.
It is not necessary because there may be another interpreta-
tion, other than recollection per se, for the increase in parietal
BOLD signal (e.g., attention to internally- vs externally-
generated information; Cabeza et al., 2008). This could be
tested by use of other memory judgments, such as objective
measures of internal versus external source information. The
recollection hypothesis is not sufficient either because other
behavioral findings in our previous studies remain to be
explained. For example, this hypothesis does not explain why
we have been unable to replicate the effect of conceptual
primes on R judgments when using only conceptual primes
throughout the experiment (i.e., without concurrent blocks ofrepetition primes; Taylor and Henson, in press).6 Rather, this
latter finding would seem easier to explain in terms of the
“artifact” hypothesis raised in the Introduction: that partici-
pants need to experience two different types of fluency, in
conjunction with being required to give mutually-exclusive R/
K judgments, in order for R judgments to be affected. The
latter could be tested simply by repeating the above experi-
ments, complete with fMRI, but using independent ratings of
remembering and knowing (Higham and Vokey, 2004; Brown
and Bodner, 2011; Kurilla and Westerman, 2008).
Importantly, however, the recollection hypothesis is
clearly productive, in terms of predictions for future experi-
ments. One test, for example, would be to manipulate the
study task: Only when that task is “deep” enough to engender
semantic elaboration (as likely for the “interestingness” task
used here), should the effect of conceptual primes on R judg-
ments occur (i.e., no effect should be found when the Study
task focuses on non-semantic features such as phonology/
orthographics).7 More specifically, manipulation of the likeli-
hood that the prime in particular is generated as a semantic
associate at Study should produce modulation of the
conceptual priming effect on R, but not of the repetition
priming effect on K. Further convergence might come from
considering paradigms in which semantic manipulations lead
to false recollection, such as the DeeseeRoedigereMcDermott
(DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger and McDermott, 1995),
in which conceptual fluency arising from (studied) associates
of the (unstudied) target can be misattributed to memory,
resulting in false recollection of the target.
Finally, note that the two types of prime did differ in post-
experimental testing of the prime visibility, with forced-
choice performance being above chance for conceptual
primes (and unrelated primes), but not repetition primes. This
is expected, because the perceptual overlap between Repeti-
tion primes and targets is relatively large (the same word in
different case), which results in the target more effectively
masking the prime. In the present procedure, however, it is
impossible to say whether this difference in prime visibility
(when participants are explicitly directed toward the primes)
accurately reflects prime visibility during Test blocks, and
whether such visibility actually affected priming in the main
experiment. Intentional identification of masked repetition
primes during a recognition memory test has been shown to
increase “old” responses, and in particular, false-alarm R
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whether this effect extends to incidental identification of
primes, which is difficult tomeasure. In the present study, it is
likely that the Visibility Test overestimates visibility during
the memory test: Attention is focused on identifying the
prime rather than on retrieving memories related to the
target, and the forced-choice nature of the test allows partic-
ipants to guess based on partial information or to focus on
single letters or features, whichmay explain the improvement
in performance when the prime differs from the target.
Indeed, participants who report no awareness of primes after
the experiment routinely perform above chance on the Visi-
bility Test.
Therefore, an arguably better estimate of whether primes
were visible during Memory Test blocks is simply the partic-
ipants’ self-reported awareness of “hidden words”. In our
experiments, typically fewer than half of the participants
report awareness of prime words during the experiment, and
fewer still report that they were able to identify prime words
on some trials (the rest say they saw “something” that may
have been a word). Contrary to the notion that awareness of
primes causes the (differential) priming effects, participants
who report no awareness of the masked prime words (pooled
from the present study and Taylor and Henson, in press, in
order to increase power), the same pattern of results obtains:
Conceptual priming increases R and Repetition priming
increases K (analysis and results described in Taylor and
Henson, in press). This suggests that awareness of “some-
thing” being flashed before a test item is not an important
factor in the present priming effects (see also Klinger, 2001).
Further, this null effect of awareness is consistent with
Joordens andMerikle’s (1992) finding that briefmasked primes
(57 msec) produce the JacobyeWhitehouse effect whether
participants are told of the primes’ existence in advance
(“aware” instructions) or not (“unaware instructions”).
4.2. Integration with previous fMRI results
While previous fMRI studies have implicated the hippo-
campus as well as parietal cortex in recollection, we did not
find activity in hippocampus for the R Hit > K Hit comparison
that survived whole-brain correction (though it is likely to
have had survived correction for a smaller search space, e.g.,
hippocampi alone). Nonetheless, the hippocampus was
clearly identified by the CR > K Hit comparison, and further
examination suggested that it also showed greater activity for
R Hits than KHits. Indeed, the U-shaped pattern across RHit, K
Hit and CR judgment types has been observed in numerous
previous fMRI studies, and often interpreted in terms of
hippocampal involvement in both (1) the recollection of
studied items and (2) the encoding of novel, unstudied items
(with evidence of the latter occurring even during a recogni-
tionmemory test; Buckner et al., 2011; Stark and Okado, 2003).
Indeed, using intracranial electroencephalography (EEG)
during a recognition memory test, we have recently found
both recollective and novelty effects in hippocampus, but with
different latencies (Staresina et al., in press): An early, pre-
recognition-decision recollection effect and a later, post-
recognition-decision novelty effect, which would simply
summate to produce the U-shaped pattern in the magnitudeof the BOLD response (at least, using the standard fMRI anal-
ysis employed here). The present fMRI findings reinforce these
previous findings, and go further in that the lack of an effect of
conceptual priming in hippocampus, in contrast with that
found in the parietal regions, further supports a functional
dissociation between the roles of hippocampus and parietal
cortices during recollection/recall (Ramponi et al., 2011).
The regions showing greater BOLD responses for K Hits
than Correct Rejections are broadly consistent with many
previous fMRI studies of the basic “old-new” effect, particu-
larly in that they appeared to be driven by the distinction
between Hits and Correct Rejections, rather than between
Remembering and Knowing. Most notable in this respect are
the more superior parietal regions, which concur with many
previous dissociations between inferior and superior parietal
activations during recognition memory (Wagner et al., 2005;
Cabeza et al., 2008). Nonetheless, it should be noted that Hits
and Correct Rejections differ not only in the study status of the
target item, but also in the “old-new” decision given (and
possibly perceived “targetness”; Herron et al., 2004). The
implications of this different “old-new” decision are particu-
larly important in the present paradigm, given that only “old”
decisions required a further R/K judgment. Though we
attempted to match the visual and motor requirements of the
R/K judgment with those following “new” decisions, by also
requiring a second (left/right) judgment after a “new” deci-
sion, these second judgments were unlikely to be matched in
terms of RT, overall “difficulty”, etc (and the estimated BOLD
response is likely to include contributions from both decisions
within each trial, due to their temporal proximity). This may
explain some of the prefrontal differences between K Hits and
CRs. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that we did not see
any regions that showed evidence of greater activity for K Hits
than R Hits, unlike a previous study of ours (Henson et al.,
1999), which found several prefrontal regions that were
more active for K Hits than R Hits. That study used only
a single, three-way ReKeNew judgment however (i.e., a one-
step rather than two-step R/K method, Eldridge et al., 2000;
Knowlton and Squire, 1995), and one possibility is that the
present two-step method offered better matching of the
executive processes entailed by each decision (or rendered the
R/K judgment less likely to be re-mapped to confidence;
Henson et al., 2000).
Finally, it is surprising that we did not detect any effects of
masked repetition priming, at least that survived whole-brain
correction. We have found a reliable ERP effect of repetition
primingwithin a very similar paradigm (Woollams et al., 2008),
though it is possible that this effect is too small/transient to be
easily detected with a hemodynamic measure like BOLD.
Nonetheless, others have reported BOLD effects of masked
repetition priming of visual words (though in a different task;
Dehaene et al., 2001) in ventral temporal regions, and it is
interesting to note that, at an uncorrected threshold of
p < .001, we did see a cluster of nine voxels in left anterior
ventral temporal cortex [with peak coordinates (333024)]
that showed a repetition priming effect. Indeed, this region
showed reduced BOLD responses for primed relative to
unprimed trials in the Repetition condition, but not in the
Conceptual priming condition, which is consistent with
a lexical/phonological/orthographic (i.e., pre-semantic)
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unmodulated by Memory Judgment, consistent with our ERP
effect (Woollams et al., 2008). The potential role of thismasked
“repetition suppression” effect during recognition memory
tests clearly deserves further investigation.
4.3. Caveats with present analyses
Finally, several caveats should be noted when relating our
fMRI and behavioral analyses. Foremost, the behavioral
priming effect ismeasured by the number of trials given an R or
K judgment, whereas the fMRI priming effects reflect themean
BOLD signal per trial with an R or K judgment, which was
furthermore restricted to studied trials. Thus not only is the
fMRI R/K data restricted to Hits, but logically one could find
a difference in the number of R/K judgments (behaviorally), in
the absence of any difference in the mean BOLD signal
whenever an R/K judgment is actually given (in this sense, the
BOLD signal is more like the mean RT per judgment type). We
restricted fMRI analysis to Hits because this has been
conventional in this field (as well as in ERP research), and has
the advantage of controlling for other confounding differ-
ences between Hits and, say, Misses, for example in terms of
a different “old/new” key press. It would be possible to esti-
mate the mean BOLD response to all primed and all unprimed
trials, regardless of R/K judgment type or of study status,
which might identify brain regions whose activity correlates
with the number of R/K judgments given (and hence be more
comparable to the present behavioral measure of priming).
The downside of this type of analysis however, as noted
above, would be that any such differences between primed
and unprimed trials (or correlations across participants) could
reflect trivial differences in the number of trials given
a specific key press, rather than the number of trials associ-
ated with recollection versus familiarity per se, or with correct
versus incorrect recognition memory.
A second caveat concerns how we identified brain regions
associated with recollection/familiarity. The appropriate
comparison of experimental conditions actually depends on
the hypothetical relationship between recollection and
familiarity: Whether they are redundant, independent or
exclusive (Knowlton and Squire, 1995; Mayes et al., 2007). By
contrasting R Hits with K Hits to isolate recollection, we have
implicitly assumed that recollection is redundant with
familiarity (i.e., that familiarity always co-occurs with recol-
lection, so can be canceled by subtracting K Hits from R Hits).
If however recollection and familiarity aremutually exclusive,
then any activations found for R Hits versus K Hits could
reflect either increased activity associated with recollection,
or decreased activity associated with familiarity. In this case,
an arguably more appropriate contrast would be R Hits versus
Correct Rejections to isolate recollection (and K Hits versus
Correct Rejections to isolate familiarity). Or if recollection and
familiarity are independent, then an appropriate test for
recollection might be the conjunction of a difference between
R Hits versus Correct Rejections, but no difference between K
Hits and Correct Rejections (while the contrast for familiarity
would be the conjunction of a difference between K Hits
versus Correct Rejections, but no difference between R Hits
and Correct Rejections). We have not explored these otheralternatives here, since our aim was to isolate recollection
(less so familiarity), and the fact remains that the parietal
regions we found for our comparison of R Hits versus K Hits
concur with many previous neuroimaging studies that have
used other procedures (such as objective measures of source
memory). Nonetheless, these are examples of generic
considerations that need to be kept inmindwhen interpreting
fMRI data on recollection and familiarity.
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